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credit market has proved to be problematic in South Africa. Despite the introduction of the 
National Credit Act 34 of 2005 (“NCA”) numerous South Africans are still trapped in debt. 
To alleviate this problem the NCA was amended by the National Credit Amendment Act 19 
of 2014 (“NCAA”) to promote responsible lending and borrowing. Nonetheless, certain 
regulations that were promulgated under the NCAA were challenged in Truworths v 
Minister of Trade and Industry 2018 (3) 558 (WCC) (“Truworths”) on the basis that they 
discriminated against the informally employed and financially excluded since they require 
consumers to provide bank statements, pay slips or financial statements as proof of 
income. This article presents a reflective appraisal of  Truworths  in the light of its support 
for access to credit by those on the peripheries of South Africa’s credit market. Although 
the authors applaud the decision in Truworths as having the potential to open up the 
credit market to the financially excluded, they also raise concerns about whether striking 
down regulations that encourage consumers to open bank accounts is the optimal 
approach to promoting financial inclusion in South Africa. 
Keywords: National Credit Act; Financial inclusion; Over-indebtedness; Historically 
disadvantaged individuals; Low-income consumers; Affordability assessment 
regulations; Reckless lending 
1 INTRODUCTION 
The introduction of new legislation and regulations in the field of consumer credit law is 
hardly amicable due to the multiplicity of conflicting interests at stake.1 On the one hand 
consumers are entitled to access safe and affordable credit and on the other hand the 
credit providers, their shareholders and investors are equally entitled to a fair profit or 
return on investment.2 The issue of consumer credit regulation is very contentious in 
South Africa because of its history of systematic disempowerment which caused 
economic unevenness and precluded the majority of South Africans from involvement 
in the mainstream economic activities including the credit market.3 
Following the advent of democracy in 1994, the opening of the economy to 
external financial flows and global influences encouraged the alignment of national laws 
and policies with international norms and standards.4 The new age of political liberty 
was seen as the appropriate basis for economic freedom and financial inclusion.5 The 
post-apartheid policy environment has therefore been concerned with redressing the 
                                                 
1 Kelly-Louw M (with contributions by Stoop P) Consumer credit regulation in South Africa (Cape Town: 
Juta & Company 2012) at 292. 
2 Feldman LP Consumer protection: problems and prospects (Michigan: West Publishing Company 1976) at 
47. 
3 See Department of Trade and Industry Making credit markets work: a policy framework for consumer 
credit (2004) at 8. 
4 Hawkins P “The visible hand: shaping stability and inclusion in the South African financial sector” in 
Bhorat H et al (eds) The Oxford companion to the economics of South Africa (Cape Town: Oxford University 
Press Southern Africa 2014) at 174. 
5 Bhorat H et al “The economic policy of South Africa: past, present and future” in Bhorat  (2014) at 1. 
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historical legacy of the apartheid regime and creating a new society founded on human 
dignity, equality and freedom.6 Also, there is a widespread belief in the new South Africa 
that “[s]ustainable and inclusive economic growth and development will be aided by 
improving access to financial services for the poor, vulnerable and those in rural 
communities”.7 
The National Credit Act8 ( “NCA”) and its regulations were inter alia enacted to 
promote access to credit by those who could not previously access it and to combat 
reckless lending.9 However, the number of consumers with good credit scores has 
progressively deteriorated despite the NCA.10 As a result, the legislature amended the 
                                                 
6 See s 1(a) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 1996 (“Constitution”). The equality 
principle is one of three democratic values that are central in the Bill of Rights (“BOR”). It is noteworthy 
that the right to equality is the first right contained in the BOR. Section 9 of the Constitution provides as 
follows: 
“     (1) Everyone is equal before the law and has the right to equal protection and benefit of the law. 
 (2) Equality includes the full and equal enjoyment of all rights and freedoms. To promote the 
achievement of equality, legislative and other measures designed to protect or advance persons, 
or categories of persons, disadvantaged by unfair discrimination may be taken. 
 (3) The state may not unfairly discriminate directly or indirectly against anyone on one or more 
grounds, including race, gender, sex, pregnancy, marital status, ethnic or social origin, colour, 
sexual orientation, age, disability, religion, conscience, belief, culture, language and birth. 
 (4) No person may unfairly discriminate directly or indirectly against anyone on one or more 
grounds in terms of subsection (3). National legislation must be enacted to prevent or prohibit 
unfair discrimination. 
 (5) Discrimination on one or more of the grounds listed in subsection (3) is unfair unless it is 
established that the discrimination is fair.” 
The Promotion of Equality and Prevention of Unfair Discrimination Act 55 of 2003  (“PEPUDA”) was 
enacted to give effect to the right to equality. In South Africa, the concept of equality does not merely 
entail identical treatment of persons in identical circumstances (formal equality) but rather it permits 
differential treatment aimed at achieving genuine social equality in the form of substantive equal 
outcomes. See for instance President of the Republic of South Africa v Hugo 1997 (4) SA 1 (CC). For an in-
depth discussion of the right to equality, see Currie I & De Waal J The Bill of Rights handbook 6th ed (Cape 
Town: Juta Law 2013) chap 9; and Albertyn C & Goldblatt B “Equality” in Woolman S & Bishop M (eds) 
Constitutional law of South Africa 2nd ed (Cape Town: Juta Law 2008) chap 35. 
7 See National Treasury A safer financial sector to serve South Africa better (2011) Policy document at 7. 
8 Act 34 of 2005. It should be noted that all sections of legislation or regulations cited in this article refer 
to those of the NCA or its regulations, unless otherwise indicated. The NCA was enacted at a time when 
population groups consisting of poor people were drowning in debt. By November 2006, approximately 
75 000 consumer debt defaults had already issued and about 4 million South Africans had been 
blacklisted by the credit bureaux. The number of administration orders that were granted annually 
skyrocketed to such an extent that they were referred to as an “industry”. See Boraine A “Some thoughts 
on the reform of administration orders and related issues” (2003) 45(1) De Jure at 217; Boraine A “The 
reform of administration orders within a new consumer credit framework” in Kelly-Louw M et al (eds) 
The future of consumer credit regulation: creative approaches to emerging problems (Abingdon, UK: 
Routledge 2008) at 187; and Kelly-Louw M “The prevention and alleviation of consumer over-
indebtedness” (2008) 20 SA Merc LJ 200 at 204. 
9 See s 3(a) and s 3(d). 
10 The 2017-2018 annual report shows that as at 31 December 2017 there were 25.31 million credit 
active consumers of whom 9.70 million had impaired credit records. See National Credit Regulator 
“Annual report” 2017/18 available at https://www.ncr.org.za/annual-reports (accessed 06 April 2019). 
The NCA became fully operational on 1 June 2007. See Proc 22 in GG 28824 of 11 May 2006. For a 
discussion of how the Act was implemented, see Otto J & Otto RL The National Credit Act explained 4th ed 
(Durban: LexisNexis 2016) at 8-11. 
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Act11 to provide the Minister with the power to promulgate new regulations12 
pertaining to credit provision. Some of these new regulations were recently challenged 
before the Western Cape High Court in Truworths v Minister of Trade and Industry 
(“Truworths”) .13 This case is crucial because it has a major bearing on the future 
participation of historically disadvantaged individuals ( “HDIs”)14 and low-income 
consumers in South Africa’s financial services sector , especially the credit market.15 
Research on credit behaviour and its potential implications for policy and 
regulation conducted by FinMark Trust on behalf of the National Credit Regulator 
(“NCR”) indicates that 39 percent of adults in South Africa (13 155 679 individuals) can 
be categorised as HDIs.16 A large majority of them live in rural areas, are under the age 
of 30 and are not economically settled. Many of them rely on government grants or 
family members for income. They have low levels of income in the range of about R2 
000 or less per month and some of them do not have an income at all.17 Most HDIs face 
infrastructure problems relating to water, sanitation and electricity as well as physical 
proximity to mainstream financial institutions. Research conducted by FinMark Trust 
also shows that 49 percent of HDIs have commercial bank products, 7 percent use 
formal non-bank products, 12 percent rely solely  on informal financial services, and 32 
percent of them do not use any financial products at all.18 This article presents a 
reflective analysis of the Truworths case and discusses its implications for access to 
credit by HDIs and low-income consumers in South Africa.  
2 CONTEXTUAL BACKGROUND 
Before the NCA, the credit market that had developed in South Africa was characterised 
by discrimination, abuse of consumers and inadequate consumer protection.19 The 
                                                 
11 See National Credit Amendment Act 19 of 2014 ( “NCAA”). 
12 See GN R202 in GG 38557 of 13 March 2015. 
13 2018 (3) SA 558 (WCC). 
14 HDIs are defined in s 2(6) of the NCA as consumers that were previously excluded from participating in 
the mainstream economy on the basis of race. See also FirstRand Bank Ltd v Maleke and Three Similar 
Cases 2010 (1) SA 143 (GSJ). 
15 Financial inclusion which means that “all persons have timely and fair access to appropriate, fair and 
affordable financial products and services”, has become an important policy goal in South Africa. National 
Treasury has underscored the need to enhance financial inclusion in South Africa under the “twin peaks” 
system of regulation. See s 1 of the Financial Sector Regulation Act 9 of 2017. See also National Treasury 
(2011) at 7. For further discussion of financial inclusion, see Hannig A & Jansen S “Financial inclusion and 
financial stability: current policy issues” (2010) ADBI Working Paper 259 at 1-29; and Claessens S “Access 
to financial services: a review of issues and public policy objectives” (2006) 21 World Bank Research 
Observer at 207. 
16 See FinMark Trust Credit and borrowing in South Africa: FinScope consumer survey South Africa (2012)  
A report for the National Credit Regulator at 15 and 19. 
17 See FinMark Trust (2012) at 15 and 19. 
18 See FinMark Trust (2012) at 15 and 19. Regrettably, there are no available recent statistics regarding 
the aggregate numbers of low- income or low- asset debtors in South Africa. See Coetzee H “Is the unequal 
treatment of debtors in the natural person insolvency law justified? A South African exposition” (2016) 
25 Int. Insolv. Rev. 36 at 38 fn 17. 
19 Kelly-Louw (2012) at 14. 
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measures that were available to prevent reckless extension of credit were ineffective.20 
Thus, the NCA was enacted inter alia to democratise access to credit under sustainable 
conditions.21 This means that the Act and its regulations ought to negotiate the delicate 
balance between combatting reckless credit and promoting access to credit for HDIs 
and low-income consumers. In SA Taxi Securitisation (Pty) Ltd v Mbatha (“Mbatha”),22 
the Court, per Levenberg AJ, most eloquently noted : 
“While one purpose of the NCA is to discourage reckless credit, the Act is also 
designed to facilitate access to credit by borrowers who were previously denied 
such access. An over-critical armchair approach by the Courts towards credit 
providers when evaluating reckless credit, or the imposition of excessive 
penalties upon lenders who have recklessly allowed credit, would significantly 
chill the availability of credit especially to the less affluent members of our 
society.”23 
Originally, the NCA provided broad guidelines to credit providers on how to conduct 
pre-agreement assessments of the consumer’s ability to repay credit. Section 81(2) of 
the NCA only required the credit provider to evaluate the consumer’s “general 
understanding and appreciation of the risks and costs of the proposed credit, the rights 
and obligations of a consumer under a credit agreement; debt repayment history . . . and 
existing financial means, prospects and obligations”.24 Credit providers were virtually at 
liberty as to how they structured and conducted section 81 assessments.25 Because the 
NCA did not prescribe specific requirements on how pre-agreement assessments were 
to be conducted, numerous South Africans acquired credit they could not afford.26 The 
high levels of over-indebtedness prompted various changes in terms of the NCAA which 
inter alia provides the Minister with the power to prescribe the criteria for conducting 
                                                 
20 For a brief discussion of the history of the NCA, see Kelly-Louw (2012) at 13-18. 
21 See s 3(a). 
22 2011 (1) 310 (GSJ). It is noteworthy that the NCA in s 3(d) seeks to promote equality in the credit 
market by balancing the rights and duties of consumers and credit providers. Nonetheless, despite the 
NCA professing to balance the interests of consumers and credit providers, major aspects of the Act 
clearly aim to promote the consumer’s position in order to proactively address past injustices, and to 
prevent and relieve over-indebtedness. See Brits R “The National Credit Act and the Bill of Rights: 
towards a constitutional view of consumer credit legislation” (2017) 3 TSAR 470 at 492. 
23 Mbatha para 37. 
24 See s 81(2)(a). For a comprehensive discussion of the reckless lending provisions before the NCAA, see 
Renke S “Measures in South African consumer credit legislation aimed at prevention of reckless lending 
and over-indebtedness: an overview against the background of recent developments in the European 
Union” (2011) THRHR at 208; Renke S An Evaluation of debt prevention measures in the National Credit 
Act 34 of 2005 (unpublished LLD thesis, University of Pretoria, 2012) chap 8; and Boraine A & Van 
Heerden CM “Some observations regarding reckless credit in terms of the National Credit Act” (2010) 73 
THRHR at 650. 
25 Van Heerden CM & Renke S “Perspectives on the South African responsible lending regime and the duty 
to conduct pre-agreement assessments as a responsible lending practice” (2015) 24 Int. Insolv. Rev. 67 at 
77. 
26 At the end of December 2015, credit bureaux had the records of 23.74 million credit active consumers, 
of whom 9.87 million had impaired credit records. See National Credit Regulator “Credit bureau monitor” 
Fourth Quarter December 2015 
http://www.ncr.org.za/documents/CDM/CDM%20December%202015.pdf (accessed 06 April 2018). 
LAW, DEMOCRACY & DEVELOPMENT / VOL 23 (2019) 
 
Page | 6  
 
affordability assessments.27 Credit providers are now therefore allowed to determine 
their own pre-agreement assessment mechanisms, models and procedures provided 
that any such mechanism, model or procedure results in a fair and objective assessment, 
which must be consistent with the affordability assessment regulations made by the 
Minister.28 Accordingly, the affordability assessment regulations provide a yardstick 
against which a credit provider’s compliance with its pre-agreement assessment 
obligation in terms of section 81 is measured.29 
The affordability assessment regulations which became effective on 14 
September 201530 amended the National Credit Regulations inter alia by inserting 
regulation 23A entitled “Criteria to conduct affordability assessment”.31 Regulation 23A 
applies to current, prospective and joint consumers,32 all credit providers and all credit 
agreements to which the NCA applies.33 At the time when the NCAA and regulation 23A 
were enacted, many South Africans, particularly low - income population groups were 
drowning in debt. Thus, it is pleasing that these new changes were introduced with the 
need to promote responsible lending and borrowing in mind.34 
3 FACTS AND DECISION 
In Truworths three major retail clothing companies in South Africa , namely , Truworths 
Limited, Foschini Retail Group (Pty) Ltd and Mr Price Group Limited35 ( “ applicants”) 
made an application to the High Court seeking an order to review and set aside 
regulations 23A(4),36 (5)37 and (7)38 of the National Credit Regulations.39 The applicants 
                                                 
27 See s 82(2) as amended. 
28 Section 82(1) as amended. 
29 Van Heerden & Renke (2015) at 83. 
30 It should be noted that affordability assessment regulations came into effect on 13 March 2015, but 
after negotiations with credit providers the Minister in August 2015 granted a retrospective six-months 
moratorium to allow them time to adapt their businesses to the said regulations. See Truworths para 21. 
31 See reg 23A. 
32 See reg 1. 
33 See reg 23A(1). A detailed discussion of reg 23A is beyond the scope of this article. For further 
discussion of reg 23A, see Renke S “Die nuwe bekostigbaarheidsassessering regulasies ingevolge die 
Nasionale Kredietwet 34 van 2005 van naderby beskou” (2015) LitNet Akademies at 432. 
34 See Truworths para 8. 
35 The applicants sell their products for cash and on credit. The consumers who wish to make their 
purchases on credit have to apply for a store card which enables them to open an account, purchase 
goods on that account up to a given limit and pay for the purchased products in accordance with the 
terms of that card. See Truworths para 10. The NCA applies to these types of credit agreements and 
requires credit providers to comply with the relevant provisions of the NCA and its regulations. See s 8. 
See also Stoop P “Kritiese evaluasie van die toepassingsveld van die ‘National Credit Act’” (2008) 14(2) De 
Jure at 352; and Du Pisani A A critical analysis of the transactions to which the National Credit Act applies 
(unpublished LLM dissertation, University of Pretoria, 2011). 
36 Regulation 23A(4) is part of the new affordability assessment regulations introduced by the Minister to 
assist credit providers in determining whether consumers are able to repay their credit. Regulation 
23A(4) provides as follows:  
“A credit provider must take practicable steps to validate gross income, in relation to:- 
(a) consumers that receive a salary from an employer: 
i. latest three (3) payslips; or 
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challenged regulation 23A(4) on the basis that it unfairly discriminates against the 
unbanked and informally employed; it was promulgated without taking into account 
relevant considerations; it is ultra vires the NCA; and the manner in which it was 
enacted is procedurally unfair. 40 The applicants further argued that regulation 23A(4) 
of the National Credit Regulations is discriminatory and unreasonable because  
underprivileged members of society would not be able to comply with the prescribed 
methods of validating their gross income.41 The Minister and the NCR (“respondents”) 
rejected the applicants’ claim that regulation 23A(4) was discriminatory against  
unbanked and informally employed persons. The Minister contended that he prescribed 
the affordability assessment regulations because the existing mechanisms were 
insufficient to curb high levels of over-indebtedness.42 He asserted that when drafting 
the affordability assessment regulations he took cognisance of the fact that some South 
Africans neither have bank accounts nor receive pay slips regularly.43 According to the 
Minister, that is the reason why he revised draft regulation 23(4)44 to require self-
employed and informally employed individuals who do not receive proof of income to 
produce their latest bank statements or financial statements.45 The respondents also 
contended that regulation 23A(4) was not discriminatory because letters and affidavits 
from employers were also acceptable proof of income.46 
The Court held in favour of the applicants and set aside regulation 23A(4). 
However, it was not convinced that a case had been made out to set aside regulation 
23A(5) and (7). The main basis for setting aside regulation 23A(4) was that it unfairly 
                                                                                                                                                        
ii. latest bank statements showing latest three (3) salary deposits; 
(b) consumers that do not receive a salary as contemplated in (a) above by requiring: 
i. latest three (3) documented proof of income; or 
ii. latest three (3) months bank statements; 
(c) consumers that are self-employed, informally employed or employed in a way through 
which they do not receive a payslip or proof of income as contemplated in (a) or (b) 
above by requiring: 
i. latest three (3) months bank statements; or 
ii. latest financial statements.” 
37 Regulation 23A(5) provides that “[w]here the consumer’s monthly gross income shows material 
variance, the average gross income over the period of not less than three (3) pay periods preceding the 
credit application must be utilised.”. 
38 Regulation 23A(7) provides that “[t]he consumer must provide authentic documentation to the credit 
provider to enable the credit provider to conduct the affordability assessment”. 
39 Truworths para 9. 
40 Truworths para 44. 
41 Truworths para 44. It is noteworthy that when credit providers are conducting an affordability 
assessment, they are required to verify the (prospective) consumer’s gross income. Gross income “means 
all income earned without deductions from whatever source”. See reg 1. 
42 Truworths para 52. 
43 Truworths para 47. 
44 Draft reg 23A(4) which was published for public comment reads as follows: “A credit provider is 
required to take practicable steps to validate gross income by referring to:- (a) recent three (3) months 
consumer’s pay slips; (b) recent three (3) months bank statements; or (c) any other similar credible 
confirmation.” [Emphasis added.] See GN R597 in GG 37882 of 1 August 2014. 
45 Truworths para 47. 
46 Truworths para 49. 
LAW, DEMOCRACY & DEVELOPMENT / VOL 23 (2019) 
 
Page | 8  
 
discriminates against unbanked, informally and self-employed individuals. The Court 
adopted the view that it was manifestly unfair to require  unbanked and informal 
traders to produce financial statements to validate their gross income because most of 
them cannot comply with such a requirement.47 According to the Court, even if these 
informal traders earn relatively well to repay their credit, requiring them to produce 
bank or financial statements presents an insurmountable obstacle to access credit.48 
The Court rejected arguments by the Minister and the NCR that an affidavit or 
letter from one’s employer could qualify as a “financial statement” for the purposes of 
validating gross income.49 According to the Court, “[f]inancial statements are specific 
documents which are produced on a regular (usually annual) basis, usually by an 
accountant. The core  financial statements are a balance sheet, an income and 
expenditure statement, and a statement showing the use and application of funds”.50 
The Court pointed out that the “latest financial statements” prescribed in regulation 
23A(4) refer to regular statements and not a single document such as an affidavit or 
letter from an employer.51 The Court further pointed out that the respondents’ 
interpretation of financial statements was absurd in relation to self-employed persons. 
It questioned whether self-employed persons should write themselves letters 
confirming their gross income. The Court concluded that this would be contrary to the 
purpose for which the regulation was promulgated.52 
Furthermore, the Court noted that although regulation 23A is meant to prevent 
reckless lending, regulation 23A(4) undermines the purpose of the Act to open the 
credit market to all South Africans, specifically those who historically could not  access 
credit under sustainable conditions.53 It held that regulation 23A(4) excludes HDIs and 
other low-income consumers from accessing credit, instead of merely curbing reckless 
lending.54 The Court therefore concluded that the regulation is neither reasonable nor 
rationally connected to the purpose for which it was enacted.55 Furthermore, the Court 
held that unfair discrimination against HDIs is in contravention of sections 14(2) and 
14(3)56 of PEPUDA.57 Nonetheless, the Court refrained from making a finding on the 
                                                 
47 Truworths para 45. See also reg 23A(4)(c). 
48 Truworths para 45. 
49 Truworths para 50. 
50 Truworths para 50. 
51 Truworths para 50. 
52 Truworths para 50. 
53 Truworths para 52. 
54 Truworths para 52. 
55 Truworths para 52. 
56 Section 14 of PEPUDA provides, among other things, factors that have to be taken into account when 
determining whether discrimination is fair or unfair. Some of the factors include whether discrimination 
impairs or is likely to impair dignity; or the position of the complainant in society and whether he or she 
suffers from patterns of disadvantage or belongs to a group that suffers from such patterns of 
disadvantage. 
57 Truworths para 53. 
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applicants’ submission that regulation 23A(4) contravenes section 9(3) of the 
Constitution, in that it discriminates on the basis of race.58 
Another reason why the High Court set aside regulation 23A(4) was that the 
Minister did not take account of important factors when he enacted this regulation.59 
According to the Court, the draft regulation which the Minister initially published for 
public comment would have been sufficiently flexible to accommodate  unbanked and 
informal traders. The wording of that draft regulation required consumers to produce 
bank statements, pay slips and “any other similar credit confirmation” as validation of 
their gross income.60 The Court adopted the view that the key provision of the draft 
regulation was more elastic and accommodating compared to the rigid requirements set 
out in the impugned regulation, which prima facie excludes unbanked consumers from 
accessing credit.61 Furthermore, the Court asserted that the impugned regulation is 
skewed towards consumers with bank accounts because it was crafted along the lines of 
the proposal made by Capitec Bank. According to the Court, when Capitec Bank made 
the proposal, it had its own consumers in mind and not the interests of the financially 
excluded.62 The Court thus decided that regulation 23A(4) was arbitrarily inserted into 
the regulations since the Minister accepted and used Capitec Bank’s proposal virtually 
verbatim, despite numerous comments received from the public. For these reasons, the 
Court concluded that regulation 23A(4) must be set aside because it fails the test of 
legality which provides that both the legislature and executive “are constrained by the 
principle that they may exercise no power or perform no function beyond that 
conferred upon them by law”.63 
However, the Court rejected the applicants’ submission that affordability 
assessment regulations are ultra vires to the extent that they require credit providers to 
“validate and verify” the consumer’s financial circumstances; whereas sections 81 and 
82 of the NCA impose a duty on credit providers only to “assess”, meaning that they 
merely have to “calculate and place a value on” the consumer’s financial situation.64 
According to the Court, the duty to assess implies that the credit provider must come to 
a correct and accurate assessment. However, information provided by a consumer may 
not be accurate because of a mistake or the desperate need to qualify for credit. Thus, in 
order to curb reckless credit, the Court adopted the view that credit providers should 
verify and validate information provided by the consumer. Accordingly, the Court 
refused to set aside regulations 23A(5) and (7) which require credit providers to verify 
and validate the consumer’s information.65 According to the Court, removing a specific 
                                                 
58 The Court also refrained from making a finding on whether the manner in which the Minister revised 
draft reg 23A(4) was procedurally unfair. Truworths paras 53 and 61. 
59 Truworths para 48. 
60 See footnote 44 above for draft reg 23A(4). 
61 Truworths para 48. 
62 Truworths para 48. 
63 Truworths para 55. In this regard the Court referred to Affordable Medicines Trust v Minister of Health 
2006 (3) SA 247 (CC) paras 48 and 49. See also Fedsure Life Assurance Ltd v Greater Johannesburg 
Transitional Metropolitan Council 1999 (1) SA 374 (CC) para 58. 
64 Truworths paras 57 and 58. 
65 Truworths para 67. 
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provision for validating gross income does not do away with the need to ascertain gross 
income as a step towards calculating discretionary income.66 
4 ANALYSIS 
There is no doubt that the NCAA and the affordability assessment regulations 
dramatically changed the manner in which consumer credit is granted in South Africa. 
Before the affordability assessment regulations, credit providers were at liberty to 
determine their own evaluation mechanisms provided that the mechanisms were fair, 
objective and not based on unfair discrimination.67 This means that credit providers 
were allowed to accept any form of income validation provided it was fair, objective and 
non-discriminatory.68 However, when the new affordability assessment regulations 
became effective, they prescribed the manner in which credit providers have to validate 
the consumer’s gross income. The forms of validation that were acceptable include bank 
statements, financial statements, documented proof of income and pay slips. According 
to the Court in Truworths, these forms of validation unfairly discriminate against 
unbanked, self-employed and informally employed persons since many of them may not 
have access to these required forms of validation despite the fact that they may be able 
to repay their debts. 
The implication of Truworths is that credit providers should accept forms of 
income validation or confirmation that are more flexible and sensitive to the unique 
circumstances of HDIs, unbanked and informally employed consumers. The Court noted 
that  draft regulation 23A(4)(c) which allowed consumers to produce “other similar 
credible confirmation” was more flexible in allowing access to credit to the unbanked 
and informally employed who can afford to repay credit. Indeed, credit evaluation 
mechanisms that are rigid can push these vulnerable consumers to the fringes of the 
credit market were they can be subjected to exploitative practices by informal credit 
providers.69 Failure by mainstream or regulated financial institutions to accommodate 
these HDIs and low-income consumers can lead to their financial exclusion and over-
                                                 
66 Truworths para 67. Discretionary income means : “Gross Income less statutory deductions, such as, 
income tax, unemployment insurance fund, maintenance payments and less Necessary Expenses (at a 
minimum defined [in the regulations]); less all other committed payment obligations as disclosed by a 
consumer including, such as may appear from the applicant’s credit records as held by any Credit Bureau 
which income is an amount available to fund the proposed credit instalment.” See reg 1. 
67 See s 82(1) of the NCA as originally enacted read with s 61(5). The Constitutional Court in Harksen v 
Lane 1998 (1) SA (CC) 300, set out the three distinct steps to determine whether an alleged violation of 
the right to equality amounted to unfair discrimination. See also Freedman W “Understanding the right to 
equality” (1998) 115 SALJ at 243; and Coetzee  (2016) at 42. 
68 Section 81(4) of the NCA provides a credit provider with a complete defence if a consumer does not 
“fully and truthfully” answer any request for information by the credit provider to enable the latter to 
carry out a proper pre-agreement assessment. See for instance Horwood v Firstrand Bank Ltd (GSJ) 
unreported case no 36853/2010 (21 September 2011). For a detailed discussion of a credit provider’s 
complete defence against an allegation of reckless lending, see Kelly-Louw M “A credit provider’s 
complete defence against a consumer’s allegation of reckless lending” (2014) 26(1) SA Merc LJ 24 at 47. 
69 See Wilson T “Responsible lending or restrictive lending practices? Balancing concerns regarding over-
indebtedness with addressing financial exclusion” in Kelly-Louw M et al (eds) The future of consumer 
credit regulation: creative approaches to emerging problems (Abingdon, UK: Routledge 2008) at 91. 
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indebtedness.70  Truworths has thus opened up the credit market to those consumers 
who were on the peripheries of the financial services sector, specifically the unbanked, 
informally employed and self-employed.71 Consumers that are informally employed or 
unbanked can now access credit despite not having a bank statement, pay slip or 
financial statement. 
However, this case does not preclude credit providers from requiring consumers 
to validate their income for the purposes of ascertaining discretionary income.72 It 
merely allows credit providers to be more flexible in the manner in which they validate 
the consumer’s gross income. The draft affordability assessment regulations did not 
provide a definition of what constitutes “other similar credible confirmation”. 
Furthermore, the Court did not provide guidance on the forms of credible confirmation 
that credit providers must accept from  unbanked and informal traders. It seems that 
credit providers will on their own determine the credible confirmation that they would 
accept as sufficient for purposes of gross income validation. However, the forms of gross 
income validation that they will accept must not unfairly discriminate directly or 
indirectly against any consumer.73 It is nonetheless submitted that the Minister and the 
NCR should provide some guidelines pertaining to the credible confirmation that can be 
accepted from unbanked, informally employed and self-employed consumers.74 This 
will assist in ensuring equitable treatment of consumers by credit providers and that 
credit is not extended based on unreliable forms of gross income validation.75 
Although the decision in Truworths is laudable for improving access to credit for 
HDIs and low-income consumers, it can also be argued that the decision is a step 
backwards from a financial inclusion perspective. The problem of financial exclusion in 
South Africa can be effectively dealt with if behavioural patterns of HDIs and low-
income consumers are changed. Financial experts agree that having a bank account in a 
                                                 
70See Wilson (2008) at 91. 
71 This decision will have a tremendous impact on financial inclusion because most HDIs and low income 
consumers do not have bank accounts. It was noted in Truworths para 20 that 20 percent of South 
Africans do not have bank accounts. Therefore, the forms of gross income validation that were prescribed 
by reg 23A(4) presented a barrier to access credit for many in less privileged social clusters. See also 
FinMark Trust “FinScope South Africa 2015 survey brochure” (2015) available at 
http://www.finmark.org.za/finscope-south-africa-2015-survey-brochure/ 
 (accessed 06 April 2018). 
72 See Truworths para 67. 
73 See s 61(1) of the NCA read with s 9(3) of the Constitution and chap 2 of PEPUDA. 
74 Proposed guidelines aimed at assisting credit providers to ascertain or validate a consumer’s gross 
income have been recently issued for public comment. For informal traders and unbanked consumers, the 
guidelines allow credit providers to accept “other forms” of income verification. See Proposed Guidelines 
for Ascertaining Consumers Gross Incomes and Discretionary Incomes for the Purposes of Regulation 23A 
of the National Credit Regulations, GN 224  GG 41604 of 4 May 2018. These guidelines are flexible and will 
promote access to credit by the unbanked and informal traders. However, the proposed guidelines 
neither define nor provide an example of what “other forms” of income validation are. An example of 
“other forms” of income validation that credit providers may accept from unbanked consumers and 
informal traders will provide important guidance and will ensure that credit is extended based on flexible 
and reliable forms of income validation. 
75 See concerns raised by Gumede M “Court ruling leaves credit providers in catch-22 situation” Business 
Day 28 March 2018 available at https://www.businesslive.co.za/bd/companies/financial-services/2018-
03-28-court-ruling-leaves-credit-providers-in-catch-22-situation/ (accessed 22 April 2018). 
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financialised76 economy is a necessary step towards effective participation in the 
financial services sector.77 As such, laws and policies that encourage those on the fringes 
of the financial services sector to open bank accounts may be required in South Africa 
more than ever. The impugned regulation 23A(4) is one such provision that could have 
been used to encourage the self-employed, informally employed as well as  unbanked to 
open bank accounts in order to enable their effective participation in the financial 
services sector. Thus, from a financial inclusion perspective it is arguable that setting 
aside regulation 23A(4) was tantamount to taking “one step forward, two steps back”.78 
However, the inclination of South African courts to prefer human rights considerations 
over economic concerns is not unique to this case.79 Economic rationality almost 
invariably plays second fiddle to equality concerns in South Africa. Perhaps the history 
of racial disempowerment and exclusion has much to do with the approach that the 
Court adopted in trying to liberalise credit access for HDIs and low-income consumers 
in South Africa. 
 
                                                 
76 In modern consumerist societies, most consumers need banking and credit services to meet their basic 
needs. Financialisation  refers to “[t]he growing necessity, even sometimes the constraint, to use financial 
products to meet every day needs e.g from the basic needs such as accommodation to other social needs 
which are necessary to participate in society . . . financialisation means that financial products are less and 
less avoidable to lead a ‘normal’ life”. See Gloukiezoff cited by Wilson T “The responsible lending 
response” in Wilson T (ed) International responses to issues of credit and over-indebtedness in the wake of 
a crisis (Abingdon, UK: Routledge 2013) at 127. 
77 Research shows that the use of formal bank accounts can bring many benefits to the poor and those 
who live in rural communities. It indicates that the use of bank accounts is associated with an enabling 
environment for accessing financial services such as lower account costs and proximity to financial 
intermediaries. Thus, it may be more expensive for an individual without a bank account to access 
financial services than for a person who has one. Although some may argue that it is costly to open and 
maintain a bank account, it is noteworthy that innovation has enabled financial services providers to offer 
basic and low cost accounts for those who were previously excluded. See Allen F et al “The foundations of 
financial inclusion: understanding ownership and use of formal accounts” (2012) Policy Research Working 
Paper 62 at 2; and Oji CK “Promoting financial inclusion for inclusive economic growth” (2015) South 
African Institute of International Affairs Occasional Paper 210 at 5. 
78 However, from  behavioural economics and law perspectives, it should be noted that HDIs and low-
income consumers are not the most rationale economic agents. The fact that there are laws that 
encourage these groups to open bank accounts does not essentially mean that they will open them. This is 
particularly true amongst historically disadvantaged groups because of low levels of financial literacy in 
South Africa. Thus, laws that encourage change in behavioural patterns should be accompanied by robust 
financial education and literacy initiatives in order to have a substantive impact. For a detailed discussion 
of the behavioural approach to law and economics, see Wright JD & Ginsburg DH “Behavioral law and 
economics: its origins, fatal flaws and implications for liberty” (2012) 106 Northwestern University Law 
Review at 1033; and Sunstein CR et al “A behavioral approach to law and economics” (1998) Coase-Sandor 
Institute for Law and Economics Working Paper No.55 at 2. For further discussion of financial inclusion 
and financial literacy, see Pearson G, Stoop PN & Kelly-Louw M “Balancing responsibilities – financial 
literacy” (2017) 20 PELJ at 1; and Rootman C & Antoni X “Investigating financial literacy to improve 
financial behaviour among black consumers” (2015) 8 Journal of Economic and Financial Sciences at 474. 
79 See Hoffman v South African Airways 2000 (12) BLLR 1365 (CC). See also Osode PC “Defining the limits 
of permissible employment discrimination against persons living with HIV/AIDS in South Africa: Hoffman 
v South African Airways [2000] 12 BLLR 1365” (2001) 45 Journal of African Law 217 at 226. See further 
comments made by Cameron J in a dissenting judgement in Paulsen v Slip Knot Investments 777 (Pty) Ltd 
2015 (5) BCLR 509 (CC). 
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5 CONCLUSION 
The regulation of reckless lending are arguably the most controversial provisions of the 
NCA.80 It is difficult to balance the need to promote access to credit for underprivileged 
consumers with the need to combat reckless lending. Nonetheless, the Court in 
Truworths succeeded in striking a balance between these conflicting societal interests. 
Although the Court has removed the obstacle in regulation 23A(4), the judgment still 
requires flexible forms of gross income validation. Therefore, it is both desirable and 
important that the proposed guidelines recently issued by the NCR on the forms of gross 
income validation that credit providers could accept, are brought to finality as soon as 
possible. Such a development would go a long way to ensure equitable treatment of 
consumers and simultaneously avoid reckless lending. The judicial pronouncement in 
Truworths has undoubtedly enlarged the space for the unbanked and informally 
employed to participate in the financial services sector. Nonetheless, concerns remain 
as to whether striking down regulations that encourage the unbanked to open bank 
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